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F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971)];
e The compromise of $32.5 mil-
lion approved in Hartford Hospital
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. [52 F.R.D.
131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)]; and
* The jury award, after trebling,
of nearly $29 million in Philadel-
phia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 1964 Trade Cas.
71, 123 (E.D. Pa.)].
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
AGAINST ANTITRUST EXPOSURE
The "antitrust audit" is a proce-
dure that is particularly adapted
to meeting the need for preventive
maintenance in the area of corpo-
rate antitrust exposure. One com-
mentator has very aptly and con-
cisely expressed the purposes of
an antitrust audit:
"[l]ts purpose should be re-
garded as being somewhat like
that of the financial audits per-
formed by certified public accoun-
tants. Frequently such financial
audits disclose nothing not previ-
ously known to top management.
They constitute, however, a form
of insurance against unsuspected
losses." Hale, Antitrust Audits, I
CORP. PRAC. COM. 17, 18
(1959) [hereafter cited as
"Hale" 1.
Frequency and Scope of Audit
There is no uniform practice as
to the frequency of antitrust audits.
Although annual audits may be too
frequent, a 10-year interval be-
tween audits is certainly too long.
Id. In addition, the costs of an
exhaustive survey may be high.
Therefore, caution should be taken
not to overdo the audit.
It has been suggested that the
audit should initially consist of a
more or less superficial review of
the company's activities together
with a series of "penetrating spot
checks." Id. at 25. If this examina-
tion does not reveal any antitrust
problems or potential problems,
the audit may be terminated. If,
on the other hand, the opposite
situation is revealed, an exhaustive
audit should be undertaken.
Audit Procedure
It has been observed that, al-
though corporate antitrust review
was formerly concentrated on spe-
cific business practices, it must
now cover a wide range of intracor-
porate reports regarding competi-
tion, acquisition, new products,
business development and plan-
ning, press releases, annual reports
and other communications to
shareholders, and even releases to
securities analysts. Loughlin, The
Naughty Words of Antitrust, 54
A.B.A.J. 246, 247 (1968) [here-
after cited as "Loughlin"].
Outside counsel should be em-
ployed to perform the audit in or-
der to provide the necessary ob-
jectivity and to "avoid the negatives
inherent in policing." See Ander-
son, Effective Antitrust Compliance
Programs and Procedures (An Out-
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line), 18 Bus. LAW. 739, 745




The first step of the antitrust
audit procedure is to obtain com-
pany and industry facts. See Hale,
above, at 18. Outside counsel
should interview corporate officers
and review the files at the client's
principal offices. Indeed, it is ad-
visable that files be kept in central
locations accessible to periodic
spot checks by counsel. VANCISE
& DUNN, How To COMPLY WITH
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 341 (Com-
merce Clearing House, Inc., Chi-
cago, 1954) [hereafter cited, VAN-
CISE & DUNN].
Attention should be given to all
phases of the business. Of course,
the audit should be performed in
cooperation with the corporate
secretary and house counsel, be-
cause they are usually extremely
knowledgeable about the company's
day-to-day operations, and their
suggestions will invariably prove
of value to outside counsel. See
Hale, above, at 25.
DOt:UMEN'TS To BE
EXAMIINED
In an exhaustive audit, counsel
should examine the following doc-
uments and files:
* Minutes of the meetings of the
board of directors and key man-
agement committees.
* Files of policy-making execu-
tives.
* Previously issued company di-
rectives on antitrust subjects.
* Sales Department files, in-
cluding:
--- Reports from the field or-
ganization.
--> Agreements and correspon-
dence with distributors and dealers.
Agreements and correspon-
dence with customers, actual and
potential.
- Sales literature and adver-
tising. In addition to other poten-
tial antitrust problems in the word-
ing of advertising (referred to
below), heavy advertising expen-
ditures have been the subject of
judicial scrutiny. See American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
--> Terms of sales "promotions"
(such as offers, for a limited time,
of two items for the price of one).
See National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.
1969); discussion of Robinson-
Patman Act 115 U.S.C. §§13, 13a,
13b, 21 a I in the section on "Price
Discrimination," below.
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[Antitrust considerations con-
cerning these documents are dis-
cussed in the section on "Illegal
Sales Practices," below. I
* Files of departments dealing
with suppliers and competitors,
such as accounting and purchasing
departments, including correspon-
dence and agreements.
e Patent files, patent licenses,
know-how agreements. Outside
counsel and patent counsel should
make a general survey of the com-
pany's patent position. See Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Haze/tine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Accu-
mulating large numbers of patents
may be a problem in and of itself.
See United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
-* Licenses should be examined
for provisions affecting prices,
production [see United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287
(1948)1, and "grant backs" [see
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws227 (1955)].
Trade Association Membership
* Files relating to membership in
trade associations, including:
Reports of those who at-
tended trade association meetings;
-- The agenda and minutes of
trade association meetings; and
--> Trade association publica-
tions.
--* Other matters that should be
examined thoroughly with refer-
ence to trade associations are:
1 Price reporting systems.
Compare United States v. Con-
tainer Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969); FTC v. Cement In-
stitute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Su-
gar Institute, Inc. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 (1936); and Ameri-
can Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
with Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925) and Cement Mfrs. Protec-
tive Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925).
1i Collection of statistical in-
formation. See Tag Mfrs. Institute
v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (lst Cir.
1949); LAMB & SHIELDS, TRADE
ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE
34 et seq. (Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, rev. ed. 1971) Ihereafter
cited, LAMB & SHIELDS 1.
1 Joint activity with respect
to the extension of credit to cus-
tomers. United States v. First
National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S.
44(1930).
11 Group lobbying. Compare
May
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Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) with
California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972). See also United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 669-72 (1965).
111 Attempts to control com-
petitive practices. See Fashion
Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
LAMB & SHIELDS, above, at 20
et seq.; product simplification and
standardization is dealt with at 74
et seq. As to a combination to
block technological improvements,
see Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), clari-
fied in 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
Pricing Practices
9 Price lists and pricing files. Out-
side counsel may wish to compare
price lists with those of competi-
tors to determine extent of identi-
cal pricing.
Although counsel may wish to
look at competitors' price lists, the
authors strongly recommend
against company personnel looking
at these price lists. Counsel should
be aware of the tension between
the Robinson-Patman Act [15
U.S.C. §§13, 13a, 13b, 21],which
allows a seller to take into account
its competitor's prices to the ex-
tent of "meeting, but not beating,"
those prices, and the Sherman Act
[15 U.S.C. §§l-7], which strives
towards differentiated pricing, and
in which conscious parallelism-
one form of which may be basing
prices on the prices of one's com-
petitors-may be evidence, al-
though not proof, of price-fixing.
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distributing Corp.,
346 U.S. 537 (1954). But see
United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th
Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395
(1959); and Morton Salt Co. v.
United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th
Cir. 1956).
Even if it could be shown that
price-list examination by company
personnel was done to prevent
identity of prices, independent
pricing decisions, without any
knowledge of competitors' prices,
are much more likely, in the long
run, to lead to the differentiated
pricing structure that is the desired
goal of the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, it is desirable
for the seller's salesmen to keep
records of instances in which they
have attempted to verify the al-
legedly lower prices of their com-
petitors. Such a practice, which
should be the result of written
company policy, will evidence that
this examination of competitors'
prices was not done pursuant to
a general price-fixing scheme, but
rather was done to satisfy the re-
quirements of the proviso to sec-
1973
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tion 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 15 U.S.C. §13(b). Further-
more, such records will be ex-
tremely useful if the company is
ever charged with a Robinson-
Patman violation.
-- Counsel should examine fair
trade contracts, if any. The various
provisions of the laws of those
states having fair trade statutes are
set forth in TRADE REG. REI,.
6041-47. See also, United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956).
--> With reference to potential
Robinson-Patman Act violations,
counsel should make a careful
examination in the problem areas
listed in the section on "Price Dis-
crimination," below,
Other Documents
* Threats of antitrust action that
have been received, if any, and
letters of complaint from custo-
mers or competitors. See Hale,
above, at 19.
* Acquisition and merger files.
" Files relating to joint ventures.
See United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
* Files relating to standardization.
Problems in this area are frequent-
ly encountered in connection with
trade associations. See the section
on "Trade Association Member-
ship," above.
* Restrictive labor agreements.
See South-East Coal Co. v. Con-
solidated Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 983 (1971); United States v.
Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n,
1957 Trade Cas. 68,599 (S. D.
N. Y.); United States v. Tobacco
& Candy Jobbers Ass'n, 1954
Trade Cas. 67,798 (D. Ohio).
* Annual reports and stock pro-
spectuses. See Loughlin, above, at
247.
SPECIFI: PROBLEN I AREAS
In checking these documents,
counsel should pay particular at-
tention to the problem areas dis-
cussed below. The authors make
no pretense that this outline con-
stitutes anything but the barest
skeleton of antitrust information.
This discussion is intended merely
to give the practitioner an indica-
tion of the types of conduct that
should be examined more closely
and of some of the leading cases
in which these practices are dis-
cussed and in which standards of
legality are indicated.
Illegal Sales Practices
Among the sales practices that
may be illegal under the antitrust
laws-indications of which may
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* Tie-in Sales-A requirement
by the seller that the purchaser
buy a second product (the tied
product) as a condition to being
allowed to buy the tying product.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. I (1958); Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947). Under Sher-
man Act §1 115 U.S.C. §II nei-
ther the tying nor the tied product
need be a tangible good; it may
also be land, a service agreement,
credit, and the like.
* Marketing New Products-A
course of conduct by a manufac-
turer of introducing additional
lines in advance of any clear con-
sumer demand, with an intent to
preclude competitors from entering
the market.
In United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America 1148 F.2d 416,
430-31 (2d Cir. 1945)1 the Second
Circuit (per L. Hand, J.), ob-
served: "There were at least one or
two abortive attempts to enter the
industry, but 'Alcoa' effectively
anticipated and forestalled all com-
petition, and succeeded in holding
the field alone. True, it stimulated
demand and opened new uses for
the metal, but not without making
sure that it could supply what it
had evoked. . . . It was not inevi-
table that it should always antici-
pate increases in the demand for
ingot and be prepared to supply
them. Nothing compelled it to keep
doubling and redoubling its capac-
ity before others entered the field.
It insists that it never excluded
competitors; but we can think of
no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to
face very newcomer with new
capacity already geared into a
great organization, having the ad-
vantage of experience, trade con-
nections and the elite of person-
nel."
The FTC complaint against
Xerox Corporation, announced
Dec. 12, 1972, charges Xerox with
"announcing new copier models and
taking orders thereon before avail-
ability of such copiers in response
to introduction of competing cop-
iers by actual or potential compet-
itors." TRAIF R i'O,. R i- 1. 120,164,
20,207. See also the complaint in
United States v. International
Business Machines Corp., Civil
No. 69-200 (filed Jan. 17, 1969),
TRADE REG. REP. Transfer Binder,
U.S. Antitrust Cases, Summaries,
Complaints, Indictments, Develop-
ments, 196 1-1970, 1145,069 (Case
2039).
e Boycotts and Refuisals To Deal
-Concerted action by a group of
competitors to refuse by buy from,
or sell to, another person or per-
sons unless certain conditions are
met. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-
47 (1966); Klor's Inc. v. Broad-
21
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way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 211-12 (1959); Fashion Orig-
inators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
* Reciprocity-An agreement,
either explicit or implicit, or a
course of conduct of purchasing
from another company because the
company is purchasing other prod-
ucts from the concerned company
or its affiliates, or has the market
potential to do so. FTC v. Con-
solidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S.
592 (1965); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F.
Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
o Restrictive Customer and Terri-
torial Agreements-Restrictions
on the customers to whom, or the
area in which, distributors or
dealers may sell. Such restrictions
may either be imposed by a manu-
facturer on its distributors, in
which case they are designated
"vertical"; or they may result from
an agreement among competing
manufacturers or competing deal-
ers, in which case they are desig-
nated "horizontal." United States v.
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596
(1972); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
o Requirements Contracts-A re-
striction on a distributor or dealer
that, as a condition of being al-
lowed to buy the manufacturer's
product, the distributor or dealer
will not buy the products of the
manufacturer's competitors. Such
agreements are usually coupled
with an agreement by the manu-
facturer to meet all the distributor's
needs. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316 (1966); Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949).
* Leasing--Situations in which
a manufacturer will not offer its
product for sale, but will only
lease it. United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 319-25 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954); Mid-America ICEE, Inc.
v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1972
Trade Cas. 173,833, at pp. 91,
501-02 (D. Ore. 1971). See also
FTC complaint against Xerox
Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 20,164,
20,207 (announced Dec. 12, 1972).
Price Discrimination
The following is a list of prob-
lem areas that counsel should
investigate with regard to potential
violations of the Robinson-Patman
Act. For this purpose, it has been
suggested that certified public
accountants make sample audits
of the company's books. For
example, the giving of rebates is
a practice that certified public
accountants are trained to detect
and that may have an important
22
May
THE CORPORATE ANTITRUST AUDIT 23
bearing on the legality of the
client's pricing practices. See Hale,
above, at 19-20.
* The existence of price differ-
ences on the same or similar com-
modities, either with respect to
different territories or different
customers on the same functional
level in the same territory. See
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Utah
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Bor-
den Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
e The extension of, and the under-
lying calculation of, quantity dis-
counts. See FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Here
too, the services of accountants
may be necessary.
0 Any attempts at "cost justifica-
tion." See United States v. Borden
Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
* Price concessions made to meet
competition. Such concessions are
valid only within narrow limits
and should be studied carefully.
See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
* Payment of "brokerage" to cus-
tomers. See FTC v. Henry Broch
& Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
* Conditions for the granting of
advertising allowances. Counsel
should insure that the client has
instituted a practice of bringing to
the attention of all of its customers
the availability of advertising allow-
ances, special offers, and so forth.
See FTC Guides for Advertising
Allowances and Other Merchan-
dising Payments and Services, 3
TRADE REG. REP. 139,035 (1969),
amended, 50,140 (1972).
* Rendition of services only to
selected customers, or selective
payment therefor. See FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968);
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55 (1959).
9 Policy with respect to return of
goods, and supporting credit
memos.
e Shipments of extra merchandise
for which no charge is made, or at
a reduced price.
Telltale Words in Documents
The prospect of rummaging
through innumerable file drawers
of papers looking for indications
of possible antitrust violations
must seem to most counsel a
Herculean task. However, dis-
covering evidence of possible anti-
trust violations need not be like
looking for a needle in a haystack.
Counsel should bear in mind that
telltale words in documents are
often indicative of corporate activ-
ities that may have adverse anti-
trust significance.
1973
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One commentator has pointed
out that there is a wide variety of
telltale words indicating that a
document is considered a "hot"
antitrust document by its author
[see Loughlin, above, at 247]:
" "Please destroy after reading";
* "Original-no copies";
* "Personal and confidential"; and
" "For your eyes only."
Other Examples
Here are some other examples
of such telltale words [for many
of which the authors are indebted
to Loughlin, above]:
e "Aggressive" or "unethical" com-
petition, and the use of the word
"legitimate" in similar contexts.
* Objections to customer's pur-
chases of competitor's products.
e "Beating" a smaller competitor's
price.
e "Matching" a competitor's quo-
tation.
* "Aim to destroy all competition."
" Competitors will have "no objec-
tions" or will "go along."
e Sales of more than one product
in a "package deal."
e "Exploiting" weaknesses of com-
petitors. Competitive weaknesses
should never be conceded to exist.
See Loughlin, above, at 248.
* "Willingness" or "promise" to
adhere to seller's suggested prices.
e Expressions of plan to capture
a specific market share.
9 "Margins were low due to com-
petition, which we expect to be
remedied next year."
e "To you, and to you alone, the
price is (a below cost) $2.00 a
dozen."
9 Advertisement in which cor-
porate sales manager is pictured
and quoted to the effect that the
telephone assisted him a great deal,
particularly when he wanted to
communicate special offers to his
largest customers.
e Advertisement describing a com-
pany's strength and importance in
various fields and its plans to
establish positions of comparable
strength in new fields.
* Investment house reports refer-
ring to a corporation's opportuni-
ties for expanding sales by effec-
tive "trade relations," to its"captive"
customers, to its "virtual monopoly"
as to a specific product, or to its
"inherent advantages" over smaller
competitors. Any company that
24
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knows it is to be the subject of such
a write-up should insist upon an
antitrust evaluation of the pro-




In the course of reviewing a
client's files for documents evi-
dencing policies or acts that may
give rise to antitrust liability, coun-
sel should bear in mind the de-
sirability of instituting a document
retention program. Such programs
have an accepted place today in
corporate administrations. Whiting,
Antitrust and the Corporate Ex-
ecutive 1, 48 VA. L. REV. 11, 14
(1962). One reason for such pro-
grams is the economy resulting
from savings of record storage
costs. See Beckstrom, Destruction
of Documents with Federal Anti-
trust Significance, 61 Nw. U. L.
REV. 687, 688 (1966) [hereafter
cited as "Beckstrom"1.
More important, since a com-
pany's internal thought processes
when reduced to writing are sub-
ject to discovery by compulstory
process in antitrust cases [FED. R.
Civ. P. 341, any documents no
longer required--either because
of their nature or their age-
should be discarded.
As of March 1972, with respect
to the federal government alone,
there were more than 1,000 stat-
utes and regulations requiring
document retention for periods
ranging from 30 days to "per-
manent." [These requirements are
summarized in Guide to Record
Retention Requirements, 37 Fed.
Reg. 4602 (1972).]
For example, the Internal Reve-
nue Service regulations, while not
aimed at a large variety of docu-
ments, specify retention rules that
apply to all businesses. Documents
covered by the IRS regulations
must be retained "so long as the
contents thereof may become ma-
terial in the administration of any
internal revenue law." Id. at 4635.
Establishing a Program
In establishing a document
retention program for a corporate
client, the document retention
policy must have some specific
guidelines. The actual number of
years of retention should be gov-
erned by a "rule of reason." This
may require detailed discussion
with management of the frequency
with which the documents in ques-
tion are examined, and the harm
to the company from early destruc-
tion.
Although it is obviously neces-
sary to conform to statutory
requirements, it is usually desir-
able not to retain documents any
longer than necessary. The number
of times that documents will be
useful in defending an allegation
of an antitrust violation will prob-
ably be outweighed many-fold by
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Legal Implications of
Document Destruction
In counseling the client on the
subject of destruction of corporate
documents that may contain in-
criminating evidence, the attorney
may have to act as a moderating
influence, and should even err on
the side of caution, since both com-
mon sense and the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics compel the con-
clusion that the client, not the
lawyer, go to jail. ABA CANON 15
provides in pertinent part that "the
office of attorney does not permit,
much less demand of him for any
client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He
must obey his own conscience, not
that of his client."
To be sure, there is little likeli-
hood that destruction of documents
pursuant to an established docu-
ment retention program prior to
knowledge of any investigation in
which the documents might be
relevant would lead to prosecution
on any theory of criminal liability.
See Beckstrom, above, at 702-03.
However, it is or may be illegal
to destroy documents in the follow-
ing circumstances:
* After service of process re-
quiring their production [id. at
691-97];
* In the course of voluntary
cooperation with authorities [id.
at 697-700]; or
* After learning of a relevant in-
quiry but before being contacted
by the authorities [id. at 700-02].
Preservation of Relevant
Documents
Furthermore, since it is or may
be illegal to select certain docu-
ments and destroy them under the
circumstances just described, it
would be illegal knowingly to
permit documents to be destroyed
by others pursuant to a previously
arranged destruction program; a
direction to interrupt the program
would be called for. Id. at 704.
See also Grand Jury Investigation
(General Motors Corp.), 1962
Trade Cas. 70,426 (S.D.N.Y.),
where the Justice Department
wrote General Motors that it was
aware of its "document retention
policy" and that "the law precludes
the destruction by General Motors
of any documents which General
Motors has reason to believe may
be sought by the grand jury at a
later date."
When documents are destroyed
under circumstances where it is
unlikely that criminal sanctions for
destruction will follow, it is, of
course, possible that adverse infer-
ences might be drawn from the
fact that the documents had been
destroyed. See Beckstrom, above,
at 687. Further, given the wide-
spread use of modern duplicating
machines, it may be impossible to
locate and destroy all copies of a
26
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document in larger corporations.
These eventualities should be
inputs into the balancing process
in arriving at a determination to
destroy a given document or
documents.
In addition, whatever document
retention program is adopted, it
must be impartial. One commenta-
tor has aptly stated: "A company
may not pick and choose between
so-called good and bad documents;
insofar as it elects to submit to
trial by files, those files should
represent an accurate picture of
the transactions involved, for
better or for worse." VANCISE &
DUNN, above, at 341.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
FOLLOWING AN AUDI'T
If the audit reveals substantive
antitrust violations or potential
violations, counsel will, of course,
advise the client to take appro-
priate steps to remedy the situation.
Hale [above, at 24-25] discusses
the dilemma of whether to make
these recommendations orally or
in writing:
"Careful lawyers always prefer
that the opinions which they pre-
pare for their client's guidance be
in written form, rather than ex-
pressed orally. Yet, it is often
considered inadvisable to have in
the client's files a catalog of poten-
tial antitrust violations. Although
an attorney's opinion letter or
memorandum may be a privileged
communication, there is always a
hazard that some employee, un-
familiar with the risks involved,
will permit an investigator to have
access to it. In these circum-
stances counsel frequently has
found it advisable to have a client's
copy of a written opinion returned
to counsel for destruction after it
has been circulated among the
client's officers."
In addition, counsel should
advise the client to embark on a
comprehensive antitrust compli-
ance program. A full discussion
of antitrust compliance programs
is beyond the scope of this article.
For good discussions of antitrust
compliance programs, see e.g.,
Lipson, How To Implement an
Antitrust Compliance Program,
THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, Dec.
1971, p. 39. See also Anderson,
above, and VANCISE & DUNN,
above.
Educating Management
In many instances, the audit will
reveal to counsel the really appal-
ling ignorance of some high-level
management in even large com-
panies of the nature and scope of
the antitrust laws. In such cases,
counsel should, at the very least,
give some instruction to manage-
ment-perhaps in the form of a
series of short seminars---concern-
ing the general nature of the anti-
trust laws and the potential liabil-
ity thereunder. Such instruction to
management can then be followed
27
1973
28 THE PRA CTICA L LAWYER (Vol. 19-No. 5)
up by policy directives to lower-
level employees.
However, counsel should be
aware that even express instruc-
tions to corporate employees con-
cerning obedience to the antitrust
laws will not exculpate either the
corporate entity or high man-
agerial agents if the instructions
are "general" and no steps have
been taken to enforce the instruc-
tions "by means commensurate with
the obvious risks." United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1972
Trade Cas. 74,190 at 92,925
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. S. Ct., Jan.
16, 1973).
CONCLUSION
It is an old maxim that an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of
cure. This aphorism is nowhere
more applicable than to the field
of antitrust, where wise counsel are
daily reminded of the potential
disasters of governmental actions,
possibly criminal in nature, and
treble-damage litigation. Balanced
against these considerations, the
antitrust audit is well worth the
costs for professional services
rendered and the possible tem-
porary slight disruption to the
client's business operations.
Every responsible corporate program for compliance at least
commences with some review of some areas in which the antitrust
laws apply to the individual corporation. The breadth, depth, and
accuracy of this survey will depend upon the extent to which the
client wishes to insure that counsel has a sound foundation of fact
upon which to build, with his legal tools, an effective compliance
structure ....
Finally, counsel will, if he is wise, check his findings against his
company's files. In this connection the attorney must remember at
all times that the most authoritative advice of compliance, dutifully
followed, may avail little, should a court find that the recommended
lawful acts were undertaken pursuant to some written unlawful
intent.
This legal inventory of antitrust issues will necessarily proceed
item by item. Needless to say, however, at the completion of the
inventory the component corporate items must be carefully fitted
together to form the composite corporate picture, because inoffensive
individual parts may collectively disclose a very different antitrust
totality.
JERROLD G. VAN CISE, THE FEDERAL ANrITRUST LAWS
49, 51 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, D.C., rev. ed. 1965).
